On 28 January 2009, Japan announced its intention of sending a naval task force to join international efforts to stop piracy off the coast of Somalia. The deployment would be highly unusual, as Japan's non-aggressive constitution means Japanese military forces can only be used for defensive purposes. The issue has been controversial in Japan, although the ruling party maintains this should be seen as fighting crime on the high seas, rather than a "military" operation. The process of the Prime Minister of Japan, Taro Aso, giving his approval is expected to take approximately one month.[30] However, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the Japanese government face legal problems on how to handle attacks by pirates against ships that either have Japanese personnel, cargo or are under foreign control instead of being under Japanese control as current Article 9 regulations would hamper their actions when deployed to Somalia.[31] It was reported on 4 February 2009, that the JMSDF was sending a fact-finding mission led by Gen Nakatani to the region prior to the deployment of the Murasame-class destroyer Samidare and the Takanami-class destroyer Sazanami to the coast of Somalia with a 13-man team composed of Japanese Ministry of Defense personnel, with members coming from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the JMSDF to visit Yemen, Djibouti, Oman, and Bahrain from 8 to 20 February.[32][33] Both JMSDF vessels are units of the 8th Escort Division of the 4th Escort Flotilla based in Kure, Hiroshima Prefecture.[34]
Japan’s Navy Warships Deploy to Somalia to Fight Piracy
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In response to the increased activity of the INS Tabar, India sought to augment its naval force in the Gulf of Aden by deploying the larger INS Mysore to patrol the area. Somalia also added India to its list of states, including the U.S. and France, which are permitted to enter its territorial waters, extending up to 12 nautical miles (22 km; 14 mi) from the coastline, in an effort to check piracy.[48] An Indian naval official confirmed receipt of a letter acceding to India's prerogative to check such piracy. "We had put up a request before the Somali government to play a greater role in suppressing piracy in the Gulf of Aden in view of the United Nations resolution. The TFG government gave its nod recently".[49] India also expressed consideration to deploy up to four more warships in the region.[50][51]On 14 March 2011, the Indian navy reportedly had seized 61 pirates and rescued 13 crew from the vessel, which had been used as a mother ship from where pirates launched attacks around the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, a Bangladeshi ship hijacked by pirates last year was freed after a ransom was paid.[52]
The South Korean navy is also making plans to participate in anti-piracy operations after sending officers to visit the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet in Bahrain and in Djibouti.[70] The South Korean cabinet had approved a government plan to send in South Korean navy ships and soldiers to the coast of Somalia to participate in anti-pirate operations.[71] The ROKN was sending the Chungmugong Yi Sun-sin class destroyer Munmu the Great to the coast of Somalia.[72] The Cheonghae Unit task force was also deployed in Somalia under CTF 151.[73]
The Spanish Air Force deployed P-3s to assist the international effort against piracy in Somalia. On 29 October 2008, a Spanish P-3 aircraft patrolling the coast of Somalia reacted to a distress call from an oil tanker in the Gulf of Aden. To deter the pirates, the aircraft flew over the pirates three times as they attempted to board the tanker, dropping a smoke bomb on each pass. After the third pass, the attacking pirate boats broke off their attack.[77] Later, on 29 March 2009, the same P-3 pursued the assailants of the German navy tanker Spessart, resulting in the capture of the pirates.[78]
The UN Security Council adopted a resolution on 20 November 2008, that was proposed by Britain to introduce tougher sanctions against Somalia over the country's failure to prevent a surge in sea piracy.[146] The US circulated a resolution that called upon countries having naval capacities to deploy vessels and aircraft to actively fight against piracy in the region. The resolution also welcomed the initiatives of the European Union, NATO and other countries to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia. US Alternate Representative for Security Council Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo said that the draft resolution "calls on the secretary-general to look at a long-term solution to escorting the safe passage of World Food Programme ships."[147] Even Somalia's Islamist militants stormed the Somali port of Harardheere in the hunt for pirates behind the seizure of a Saudi supertanker, the MV Sirius Star. A clan elder affiliated with the Islamists said "The Islamists arrived searching for the pirates and the whereabouts of the Saudi ship. I saw four cars full of Islamists driving in the town from corner to corner. The Islamists say they will attack the pirates for hijacking a Muslim ship."[148]
Since Gulf of Aden deployments will not persist indefinitely, however, it is time to reflect on the implications of China's experience therein. What has China achieved over the past six years through antipiracy operations? Has the global fight against maritime piracy enlarged China's global naval presence? Finally, what will China's global naval presence resemble in the post-Gulf of Aden era?
Deterring and occasionally fighting piracy off Somalia, the PLAN has accumulated unprecedented operational experience. Over 30 warships-half the PLAN's destroyers, frigates and helicopters; and nearly all its replenishment ships-have thus gained Far Seas experience (China Daily, February 12). PLAN maritime logistics systems have been tested, sometimes strenuously, by antipiracy deployments in unfamiliar waters that can last up to six months. Beyond the operations themselves, Gulf of Aden experience is a valuable resume booster for PLAN high-level officers and sailors seeking career promotion upon their return home.
Given China and Gulf of Guinea coastal states' sovereignty sensitivities, and the latter's "limited capacity and coordination problems," Chinese assistance toward fighting piracy in the Gulf of Guinea will likely involve "behind the scenes" support. The extent of Chinese involvement is contingent on whether the intensity of piracy persists, support from international law-or at least China's interpretation thereof-and regional states' explicit requests. A specific limitation: straightjacketed by Beijing's cautious policies, PLAN task forces currently lack the authority to prosecute pirates, and would need to transfer them rapidly to "a proper receiving country." [6] Initially, Beijing will likely focus on providing aid, equipment and training rather than focusing on deploying Chinese antipiracy taskforces the way it did in Aden. A possible bellwether: in May-June 2014, Chinese warships completing Aden duties sailed to Cameroon, Nigeria and Namibia for bilateral exercises. Beijing has already provided Gulf of Guinea nations with substantial military assistance, training, bilateral/joint exercise, and ships. China has already held bilateral discussions with Russia concerning Gulf of Guinea security. Sr. Col. Zhou Bo, SHADE liaison for task forces 3-17 and now managing the PLA's non-traditional security portfolio, sees ample room for Sino-American cooperation in this regard. [7] 2ff7e9595c
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